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The U.S. Program for Economic Recovery: Its Prospects 
for Success and the Implications for Latin America 
and the World Economy 
On 18 February 1981, Ronald Reagan, President of the United States, 
presented his Program for Economic Recovery. The program reflects the 
general tenor of his election campaign, i.e. focusing on the 
"uncontrolled" and "excessive" expansion of government in the U.S. 
economy. His proposals essentially involve: (i) a reduction in 
government regulations on industry; (ii) a restrictive monetary policy; 
(iii) a 41 billion dollar reduction in the expansion—^ of government 
expenditures in fiscal 1982 (with further cuts in later years), and 
(iv) accelerated depreciation allowances for business, coupled with a 
10% across-the-board tax cut for individuals in each of the next 3 years, 
all costing the government approximately $54 billion in 1982 and $222 
2 / 
billion by 1986.— I will not attempt to provide further details on the 
program here since a good summary can be found in the White House 
Summary which our Office has forwarded to Santiago, or in the February 23, 
1981 IMF Survey; more ambitious readers can also consult the original 3/ 
document for the program which we have sent to the CEPAL Library.— The 
thrust of this brief note will be contained to some observations about 
1/ The outlays will actually rise by some $40 billion (6%) in 1982 under 
the Administration's plan, which is about 50% less than would be the case 
if no measures were taken at all. Of course in real terms there will be a 
fall in expenditures. 
2/ Estimates have varied on the incidence of the reduction in taxes after 
full implementation of the plan, but it has been common to see figures of 
roughly 40% for business and 33% for individuals. 
President of the United States, America's New Beginning: A Program 
for Economic Recovery, February 18, 1981. 
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the nature of the program, its likelihood for success and its 
implications for the world economy, and Latin America in particular. 
I will attempt to be as objective as possible in the evaluation; 
however, the reader should nevertheless be forewarned that my natural 
inclination in both economics and politics is generally quite distinct 
from that of the Reagan camp, and this will inevitably color my 
perspective to some extent. 
Is there a problem? 
Few would deny that the U.S. has a problem. During 1970-1978, only 
the United Kingdom has had a lower rate of productivity growth than the 
U.S. within the group of major OECD countries;—^ in contrast, in the 
60s the U.S. ranked very high in this regard. Savings as a percent of 
disposable income declined from nearly 8% in 1971 to only 4-1/2% in 
1979; moreover the latter figure compares very poorly with savings 
coefficients of 20% in Japan, 13% in Germany, 17% in France, 14% in the 
2 / United Kingdom, and 26% in Italy.— The growth rate in non-residential 
fixed investment in the U.S. has declined from an average of 7.6% per 
3/ annum m the period 1960-1970 to only 3.4% in 1970-1979.- The U.S. 
4/ 
remains one of the highest per capita consumers of energy in the world.— 
Also, in 1979 the U.S. rate of inflation was the tenth worst within the 
24-nation 0ECD g r o u p O n e could go on; the point is that many long-run 
and short-run economic indicators confirm that Reagan is correct in 
1/ U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1979, 
Table No. 1562. 
2/ See table on p. 120 in OECD, Economic Outlook, No. 28, December 1980. 
3/ Calculated from data in the JEC, Economic Indicators, December 1980, 
and U.S. Department of Commerce, op.cit., table 715. 
4/ U.S. Department of Commerce, op .cit., table 1564. 
5/ OECD, o£.cit^. , p. 47. 
alerting the American public to the economic malaise of the country. 
In fact, most Americans already sense this, which is reflected in the 
strong underlying popular support for the President and his program. 
The President's problem focus 
Reagan's program focuses almost exclusively on reducing the role 
of government in the economy, with heavy emphasis on the inflationary 
impact of deficit financing. It would therefore be useful to examine 
the public sector deficit in the U.S. with that of other countries. 
A perusal of table 1 would suggest that the U.S. public sector deficit 
in aggregate terms is not much of a problem: the deficit as a percent of 
GNP has been virtually nil during 1977-1979, in contrast to the 
relatively large deficits of other OECD countries, but especially Japan 
and Germany, the two success stories in this group. Is Reagan's focus 
on government therefore exaggerated? I would say yes and no. While the 
overall public sector in the U.S. is not generating a large deficit 
—especially in comparison with other OECD countries— its activities could 
nevertheless be contributing significantly to inflation for a number of 
reasons. 
The federal component of the public sector finance is in a fair 
amount of deficit, as shown in table 2. While the U.S. position does not 
compare badly with Germany, and is dramatically better than that of 
Japan, on balance its deficit may be much more inflationary. One main 
reason for this is that the deficits in Germany, and especially Japan, 
are being used to offset in part the high national savings coefficients; 
in the U.S. this is not the case as savings is embarassingly low 
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(it dipped to a record low of only 3.5% of personal income in the fourth 
quarter of 1979) . Another reason is thit a deficit of only 2% of GNP 
in a trillion dollar economy is large in absolute terms and can become 
unwieldy when its full weight falls on a much more limited segment of 
the economy —i.e. capital markets; indeed crowding out and higher 
interest rates is a factor, especially in a time of uncertainty when 
risk-conscious investors are inclined towards secure investments such 
as those offered by government securities. 
Table 1 
OVERALL PUBLIC SECTOR FINANCIAL BALANCES, 1977-1980 
Surplus (+) or Deficit (-) as % of GNP 
1977 1978 1979 1980' 
U.S. - 1.0 0 , + 0.6 T- 1.0 
Japan - 3.8 - 5.5 - 5.2 - 4.5 
Germany - 2.4 - 2.7 - 3.0 - 3.3 
France - 0.8 - 1.8 - 0.8 - 0.7 
United Kingdom - 3.4 - 4.3 - 3.3 - 3.2 
Italy - 7.9 - 9.7 - 9.4 - 8.3 
Canada - 2.6 - 3.1 - 1.7 - 0.9 
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook, No. 26, p. 37. 
A Estimate 
Table 2 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT DEFICITS 
(% of GNP) 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
U.S. 3.3 2.8 2.0 1.2 2.3 
Germany 2.6 1.8 1.9 1.9 
Japan 2.0 6.1 6.5 5.3 
Source: Calculated from data in the IMF International Financial Statistics, 
various issues. 
It also must be recognized that the Federal Government expenditures 
have been a steadily rising proportion of GNP: in the last few years 
outlays have been 21%-22% of product, which is a very significant rise 
over the 18%-19% figure corresponding to 1961-1962.—/ This rise in the 
profile of the central government could affect inflation in several ways. 
First, nearly 50% of the expenditures are for so-called entitlements, 
which are transfer-like payments that have their first stage impact 
basically on consumption. Second, another one-third of the budget is for 
national defense, a notoriously inflationary sector. Third, government 
regulations with regard to consumer affairs, health and safety, have 
expanded enormously in the last ten years, raising immediately the 
private costs of compliance, with the social gains appearing only slowly 
and then they are difficult to measure explicitly in any case. Finally 
1/ IMF, International Financial Statistics, 1980 yearbook. Also note 
that expenditures in Germany were 15% of product in 1979, with the 
figure for Japan being 14%. 
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in an economy that still thrives on the myth of the free enterprise 
system, the rising share of government can have a negative psychological 
impact on the performance of certain economic sectors. 
In sum, there appear to be a number of indications that a 
retrenchment of public sector expenditures may be helpful at this point 
in time. The increased role of government over the past 20 years has 
contributed to an unprecedented prosperity for Americans —something 
Reagan incidentally overlooks— however, as in any process of development, 
formerly benign trends can eventually become counterproductive, calling 
forth an adjustment and shift of policy strategies. Thus it is 
conceivable that such a critical juncture is now presenting itself, 
making a slowdown in the expansion of expenditures appropriate. 
The other half of the Reagan program is, of course, the reduction 
in taxes. The basic premise is that inflation is pushing groups into 
ever higher tax brackets, increasing the tax burden and eroding work 
incentive, investment and productivity.—^ The theory, promoted by 
economist Arthur Laffer, and non-economist Jack Kemp of the U.S. Congress, 
is that a strong tax reduction will pay off in an economic boom of 
unprecedented proportions. This idea has reached messianic proportions 
in the Reagan camp and is associated with the new so-called "supply" 
school of economics. But ironically, the theory is not new at all in 
as much as it has its roots in classical notions that have circulated in 
economic thought for more than a century: in effect, it assumes that the 
interest rate is a function of the supply and demand for savings; a 
1/ In the last few years tax pressure in the U.S. has been equivalent to 
19%-20% of GNP, which is exceeded by a number of OECD countries. However, 
in Germany and Japan it is considerably less, ranging between 12% and 13% 
in the former and 7%-8% in the latter. IMF, International Financial 
Statistics, op.cit. 
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reduction in taxes will increase savings, lower the interest rate and 
generate an investment boom, higher productivity and economic 
recovery. Moreover, in contrast to a traditional Keynesian approach, 
the supply siders appear to assume away demand constraints and revert 
to a type of Say's law. This is reflected in Treasury Secretary Regan's 
statement to Congress the other day, in which he implied that if investment 
should rise, it would generate the required demand. 
Holding aside for the moment a critique of the supply side 
prescription, it seems fair to say that inflation is indeed pushing 
income groups into ever higher tax brackets and that this is creating 
unrest in the population. So again Reagan here would appear to be 
focusing on a real problem. 
Will the program work? 
Reagan's economic program has encountered a mixed reception among 
economists. The radical supply-siders think that the program may be a 
bit too timid, but certainly are in agreement on the general thrust of 
the measures. Some highly respected economists, such as econometrician 
Michael Evans, think that the program will bring unprecedented investment 
and growth. Meanwhile, other respected economists such as Lester Thurow 
of MIT caution that the program will only generate more inflation. Since 
I have not studied the U.S. ecenomy in such a detailed fashion as have 
Evans and Thurow, it would be presumptuous of me to enter into the 
competition with a personal forecast of the outcome of the program. 
However, I would like to point out some potential roadblocks to its success. 
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First, concentrating on the program itself, it must confront the 
asymmetry between Reagan's proposals and Congress's actions. Usually 
it is easier to cut taxes than it is to cut expenditures, and a tax 
cut without budgetary restraint would be inflationary. —^ The radical 
supply-siders would argue that this is not a problem since that tax 
cuts would provoke increased savings and massive investment. T-Ihile 
this could indeed happen, there is no empirical evidence to support 
that theory. 
Tax cuts are notoriously unpredictable in their effects because of 
uncertainties over the short-run marginal propensity to consume that 
determines the outcome of tax policy: it is difficult to predict exactly 
what proportions of marginal disposable income will actually be saved 
and consumed.In this respect, there is much debate over the effects of 
the Reagan tax cut with erudite arguments on both sides. The supply-
siders argue that since 40% of the tax cut benefits higher income groups, 
and another 44% the middle income groups, there will be a natural bias 
2/ towards savings.— On the other hand, the supply-siders may be 
exaggerating the savings effects because, as seme data in a recent 
3/ 
Washington Posfr- editorial show, only the very high income groups can 
expect real gains from the tax cut; most people will be effectively 
standing in place in as much as the tax cut simply prevents individuals 
from moving into higher tax brackets on account of inflation. 
JV It should be noted that the mood in Congress now seems to be shifting 
in favor of expenditure cuts, but there is increasing resistance to the idea 
of tax reductions, at least as proposed by Reagan. If tax cuts should lag 
behind expenditure curtailment, the net effect of policy would probably be 
deflationary. 
2/ The fact that the tax cut is skewed towards the upper income groups 
has disturbed many Democrats and explains why there is currently resistance 
to the tax proposal. 
.3/ The Post editorial was focusing on the equity issue rather than the 
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Where the program may be really vulnerable, however, is in the 
assumption that investment will take off due to lower interest rates. 
First, with regard to the rates —Reagan predictions aside— 
there is no guarantee that they will fall sharply. If tax cuts proceed 
at a faster pace than expenditure cuts, the federal deficit would rise, 
placing further pressure on interest rates. Second, commercial banks are 
reluctant to lower rates because they are very concerned about the 
slowdown in earnings growth. Third, monetary policy, which enjoys a 
degree of autonomy, is proclaimed by both the Administration and the 
Federal Reserve to be fixed in a restrictive posture, i.e., a rate of 
growth substantially less than rates of inflation. Fourth, and perhaps 
most importantly, an interest rate floor may be established on account 
of the strong correlation between interest rates and the fate of the 
dollar on foreign exchange markets. 
Beyond the direction of interest rates, there is another even more 
fundamental question mark: it is by no means certain that investment 
will be stimulated by lower interest rates alone. The typical Keynesian 
argument would be that businessmen do not invest for its own sake (as 
the classical position would hold), but rather to make profits. And in 
the very uncertain environment of today (i.e. the direction of inflation; 
strength of the dollar; changes of oil prices; changes of exchange rates, 
renewal of cold war tensions, etc.) there appears to be poor investor 
confidence and a tendency to restrict commitments to the short term where 
profits are high and sure.—^ Thus, Reagan is treading on very uncertain 
1/ As Muller has pointed out in Revitalizing America, (Simon & Shuster, 
1980), corporations have increasingly branched out into non-productive 
activities such as acquisitions, foreign exchange and real estate speculation, 
terrain when he bases his program on the reaction of investors to lower 
interest rates, if indeed these rates decline signficantly at all. 
Other considerations 
The problems noted above are all secondary to one other major 
weakness that I can perceive in the Reagan program; that is, it has an 
excessively narrow focus on government that abstracts from other very 
serious problems in the U.S., but even more importantly in the world. 
On the domestic front, Reagan apparently fails to recognize that the 
U.S. economy is not the homogeneous workplace it was 20 years ago, and 
therefore general macroeconomic fiscal and monetary policy aimed at 
reducing expansion of the public sector may not be an effective policy 
tool in and of itself. Some of the factors which can undermine the shotgun 
approach to fiscal and monetary policy are as follows: 
1) It is not the entire economy that is suffering from the 
economic malaise, but rather a few declining industries such 
as automobiles, shipbuilding, steel, textiles and related 
industries that happen to be very large employers. Many 
service and high technology information-data analysis 
industries are doing quite well, which reflects a growing 
trend to a service-led economy. Thus, global fiscal and 
monetary policy can overstimulate some industries that do 
not need it and understimulate some industries that do need 
help; 
2) Industries are increasingly controlled by large horizontal 
conglomerates that are not price takers, at least in the 
short run; 
3) That decisions to save and spend are now heavily influenced 
by institutionalized income security in the labor market; 
4) That inflation is being led by three sectors —housing, food 
and transportation. Food prices reflect the vagaries of 
weather and federal crop control programs; transportation 
costs have risen sharply because of rising oil prices, and 
housing reflects high mortgage rates, rising heating costs 
and the fact that the real estate market is pressured by 
corporate, and "mom and pop", type speculation, which in turn 
is induced by infhtion and federal tax laws (which remain 
unchanged) beneficial to property owners. 1/ 
1/ See any current issue of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI 
Detailed Report. 
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5) That the U.S. economy is still organized in such a way as to 
generate high per capita consumption of energy. 
One could go on with examples, but the point is that Reagan's program 
would benefit from targetting on specific needs of specific sectors, a 
practice which is common in the successful economies of Japan, Germany 
and Austria. But in the U.S. such a strategy is associated with planning 
and price distortions, so that mainstream, and especially Reagan supply-
side economists, would not see this as a reasonable alternative. 
On the international front, Reagan's program gives no recognition to 
workplace.. . 
the fact that the world is an ever more interdependent/;— to read his 
speech one would never know that there is a world economic crisis and 
that many of the structural problems of the U. S. are endemic to the 
global system as a whole. In and of themselves, Reagan's fiscal and 
monetary package will not stabilize the price of world oil; will not slow 
the rapid international competitiveness of LDCs in basic industries; 
will not reduce the predatory nature of Japanese export policy, etc., all 
2 / 
of which directly affect the U.S. economy.— 
Perhaps the best example of the potential naivete underlying the 
anti-big government focus of the recovery program is the proposed 3/ 
reduction of the loan authorization of the Eximbank.— The President 
argues that the reduction is because"the primary beneficiaries of taxpayer 
funds in this case are the exporting companies themselves —most of them 
profitable corporations". But the corporations that use this facility 
1/ In the last 20 years, the U.S. export coefficient has doubled, from 
roughly 5% to its current level of 10%. 
2/ When one examines the CPI in detail, it becomes obvious that rising 
oil prices are behind many lead inflationary sectors in the economy. 
3/ See p. 3 of U.S. President, op.cit. 
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such as Boeing and General Electric are profitable and successful 
overseas to a large extent because Eximbank finance permits their 
products to compete with European producers which have access to cheap 
official-export credit facilities, e.g. Coface of France and the Eximbank 
of Japan. Elimination of the export subsidy program would have made 
sense 20 years ago when companies like Boeing and General Electric had 
near monopolies on their respective world markets, but not today when 
they must compete against the likes of Airbus Industries which has an 
excellent product and offers of cheap export financing. In other words, 
this particular proposal fails to take into account the environment 
within which the U.S. must now operate, i.e. its interdependence with 
policies of other nations. 
Finally, it should be noted that this latter flaw would be fatal 
to a small country, but there is an outside chance that a large country 
like the U.S. can overcome it. President Reagan is an actor by training 
and he has a great ability to communicate and motivate. He has been 
organizing a virtual crusade on the theme of restoring the "old dynamism" 
and leadership of the U.S. economy, and he has stressed the lack of 
alternatives to his current program. Expectations are the one last factor 
in the equation which is the great unknown in the Reagan economic package. 
While important parts of the package appear to be founded more on faith 
than reason, if Reagan plays his "role" well, he perhaps can change 
expectations, which would have a positive snowballing effect in the U.S. 
economy, and, then, due to its size and the increasing international 
transmission factor, the U.S. trends would be passed onto other OECD 
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economies, bringing the world economy into a strong recovery. This, 
of course, is only a wishful scenario, but the possibility cannot be 
dismissed out of hand at this early stage. 
Conclusions and implications for Latin America 
In essence, few would disagree that the U.S. government sector 
needs some pruning right now. Spending and tax cuts would appear 
appropriate for the time if both can be done in tandem and in technically 
appropriate proportions. What concerns me is the lack of attention to 
the broader and more complex aspects of the problem in the U.S. and 
world economy. Not addressing these issues could be fatal. However, 
there is the unknown factor of expectations, which, should they be changed, 
would work in Reagan's favor. His administration (but especially the 
radical supply-siders) obviously are banking heavily on this latter factor. 
I wish them luck, but also hope that there are some alternative plans 
ready should the current program not live up to "expectations". 
As far as the Latin American economy is concerned, a recovery in the 
U.S. would have some tangible benefits. Economic growth in the U.S. would 
stimulate Latin American exports and also reduce pressures in the U.S. 
with regard to protectionism. The current high rates of interest in the 
U.S . have at least two negative effects on Latin America: (i) they put a 
large surcharge on external debt service which makes commercial obligations 
more onerous,and (ii) they push up the dollar which can hurt trade 
performance for countries importing from dollar zones and exporting to 
non-dollar zones. Thus any reduction in interest rates would provide 
relief to Latin America. At least for these reasons the region should be 
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carefully monitoring the progress of the Reagan program. However, until 
there are concrete results, it would be prudent to maintain a healthy 
skepticism about the recovery scheme, and thereby continue to explore 
domestic, regional and international solutions to the world economic 
crisis. 


